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I. Introduction 
The past year, while relatively quiet on the legislative front, saw active 
litigation of numerous oil and gas disputes in Pennsylvania courts and 
administrative agencies.  Notable issues included the proper application of 
the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Environmental Rights Amendment (Pa. 
Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth); ongoing litigation and regulation 
relating to Act 13 of 2012 (Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth and 78a 
regulations); litigation over the use of eminent domain power by midstream 
operators building pipelines (In re Sunoco cases); litigation over proper 
zoning of oil and gas related uses (EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson 
Hills); lease disputes (Hildebrand v. EQT Prod. Co.); and title disputes 
(Cornwall Mountain Inv., L.P. v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr.). 
II. Legislative and Regulatory Update 
Although numerous bills were proposed relating to oil and gas leases, 
operations, and taxation, no substantive legislation was passed in the past 
year.  
The Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) finalized new 
Chapter 78a regulations relating to the environmental impacts associated 
with unconventional oil and gas operations.   These new rules impose 
additional burdens and restrictions on operations including heightened 
design and engineering requirements for surface uses, phasing out of 
surface impoundments and greater setbacks from schools and other public 
facilities. New Chapter 78 regulations relating to conventional oil and gas 
operations are in progress and scheduled for release in the third quarter of 
2018. 
III. Supreme Court Cases 
A. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017). 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that Fiscal Code provisions 
relating to proceeds from state mineral leases violated the Pennsylvania 
Constitution’s Environmental Rights Amendment, rejecting the established 
test under the Amendment. 
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The court broadened the scope of the Environmental Rights Amendment 
to the Pennsylvania Constitution (“ERA”) by rejecting a forty-four-year-old 
test used to determine the constitutionality of Commonwealth actions under 
the ERA.1 Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation (“PEDF”) 
challenged the constitutionality of sections of the Fiscal Code that allowed 
a portion of the revenues generated from leasing state lands to be diverted 
to the General Fund without any condition or restriction that those revenues 
be allocated to environmental conservation.2 
The ERA states the following:3 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the 
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of 
the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the 
common property of all the people, including generations yet to 
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall 
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people. 
Since 1973, Pennsylvania courts applied a three-part test to 
determine whether statutes or regulations violated the ERA.  The test, 
announced by the Commonwealth Court in Payne v. Kassab, asked: 
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and 
regulations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth's 
public natural resources? 
(2) Does the record demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce the 
environmental incursion to a minimum? 
(3) Does the environmental harm which will result from the 
challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits to 
be derived therefrom that to proceed further would be an abuse 
of discretion?4 
The Commonwealth Court, reviewing PEDF’s challenge under the 
Payne test, granted summary relief in favor of the Commonwealth, 
upholding the code sections.5 On appeal, the supreme court noted that it had 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017). 
 2. Id. at 921-22; see 72 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1602-E, 1603-E, 1604-E (West 2014) [the 
“Code Sections”]. 
 3. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 4. 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).   
 5. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 928.   
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affirmed the judgment in Payne, but “without adopting the three-part test.”6  
In reviewing the constitutionality of the code sections, the court took the 
opportunity to reject the Payne test and invalidate 1602-E and 1603-E of 
the Fiscal Code under the language of the ERA, itself, and private trust 
principles.   
The court found that the ERA grants two rights to the citizens of the 
Commonwealth: the right to “clean air and pure water, and to the 
preservation of natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the 
environment;” and “the common ownership by the people, including future 
generations, of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources.”7  The third 
sentence of the ERA establishes a public trust, of which the 
Commonwealth, itself, is the trustee.8  Quoting the plurality decision in 
Robinson Township, the Court described the duties of the trustee as 
follows:9 
As trustee, the Commonwealth is a fiduciary obligated to comply 
with the terms of the trust and with standards governing a 
fiduciary's conduct. The explicit terms of the trust require the 
government to “conserve and maintain” the corpus of the trust. 
The plain meaning of the terms conserve and maintain implicates 
a duty to prevent and remedy the degradation, diminution, or 
depletion of our public natural resources. As a fiduciary, the 
Commonwealth has a duty to act toward the corpus of the trust—
the public natural resources—with prudence, loyalty, and 
impartiality.   
The court held the code sections facially unconstitutional because “[t]hey 
plainly ignore the Commonwealth’s constitutionally imposed fiduciary duty 
to manage the corpus of the environmental public trust for the benefit of the 
people to accomplish its purpose—conserving and maintaining the corpus 
by, inter alia, preventing and remedying the degradation, diminution and 
depletion of our public natural resources.”10           
  
                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. at 927 (citing Payne v. Kassab, 468 Pa. 226, 361 A.2d 263, 273 (Pa. 1976)). 
 7. Id. at 931.   
 8. Id. at 932.   
 9. Id. (citing Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 564, 83 A.3d 901, 956-57 (Pa. 
2013)) (internal citations omitted). 
 10. Id. at 938. 
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B. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 536 (Pa. 2016). 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the provisions of Act 13 of 
2012 providing for review of local zoning ordinance by the Pennsylvania 
Utility Commission were non-severable from unconstitutional provisions 
by prior decision of the court and section authorizing taking of real property 
for storage of natural gas was unconstitutional because it violated the public 
use requirement. 
The court’s decision was the latest arising from challenges brought 
against Act 13 of 2012, which amended the Oil and Gas Act to provide for 
limitations on local zoning ordinances regulating oil and gas operations. 
Robinson II (an appeal from the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court’s 
decision in Robinson I)11 held that the statutory requirement that zoning 
ordinances permit oil and gas operations in all zoning districts was 
unconstitutional (the plurality decision relying upon the “Environmental 
Rights Amendment,” Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution).12  In Robinson III, the Commonwealth Court held on remand 
that provisions providing for review of local ordinances by the 
Pennsylvania Utility Commission (the “PUC”) were not severable from the 
invalid provisions.13  
On appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the 
Commonwealth Court’s holding that Sections 3305 through 3309 
(providing for review of ordinances by the PUC and loss of well impact 
fees for municipalities that enact violative ordinances) of Act 13 were not 
severable from sections 3303 and 3304 (restricting local zoning of oil and 
gas operations).14 The court concluded that if not for the new restrictions on 
local regulation of oil and gas operations, the legislature would not have 
passed the provisions providing for PUC review, and the penalties on local 
municipalities were inextricably linked to the stricken provisions.15 
The supreme court next held that parts of Section 3222.1 of Act 13 
protecting trade secrets and confidential proprietary information violated 
the Pennsylvania Constitution’s prohibition of “special laws.”16 The court 
further held that Section 3218.1’s exclusion of private water supplies from 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012).  
 12. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 564, 83 A.3d 901 (2013). 
 13. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 96 A.3d 1104 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014). 
 14. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 536, 542 (Pa. 2016). 
 15. Id. at 566 (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1925; Heller v. Frankston, 504 Pa. 528, 475 
A.2d 1291, 1295 (1984)). 
 16. Id. at 576. 
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spill notice requirements was an unsupportable “special law” that must be 
stricken in its entirety, but stayed its striking for a period of 180 days to 
give the legislature an opportunity to revise the provision.17  
In the final part of its decision, the court examined Section 3241 of the 
Act, which provided that corporations that transport, sell or store natural 
gas had the right to appropriate interest in real property located in a storage 
reservoir or buffer zone. Plaintiffs claimed that the Section violated the 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because the provision was not limited 
to takings for public purposes.18 The Commonwealth argued that the 
provision should be interpreted to be limited to public utility corporations.19 
The supreme court held that on its face the provision was not limited to 
public utility corporations, which are limited to those corporations that 
produce, transmit, distribute or furnish natural gas “for the public for 
compensation.”20 The court held that Section 3241 provided for 
unconstitutional takings under the United States Constitution and the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.21 
IV. Superior Court Cases 
A. Birdie Associates, L.P. v. CNX Gas Co., LLC, 149 A.3d 367 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2016). 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that coal operators were not liable 
to a coal lessor for operating and producing coalbed methane, concluding 
that the operator was not required to mine coal under a lease providing for 
annual minimum royalties. 
In 1985, lessors Ethel Spragg, Joan Spragg Wemlinger and David L. 
Wermlinger leased unto Consol Land Development Company the coal 
under a tract of land containing 289.91 acres, for a term of 20 years and an 
option to renew for an additional 20-year term. CLDC exercised its option 
to renew and extended the lease until 2025. Lessee paid the advanced 
minimum royalty but mined no coal from the premises and had no plans to 
do so in the near future.22  
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. at 583. 
 18. Id. at 585. 
 19. Id. at 585-86. 
 20. See id. at 587. 
 21. Id. at 588. 
 22. Birdie Assocs., L.P. v. CNX Gas Co., 149 A.3d 367, 369 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016). 
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In 2010, successor lessor filed a complaint, alleging unjust enrichment 
because the operators were producing and marketing coalbed methane 
(“CBM”) from the leased property but not making any additional payments 
to the lessor. The court noted first that “[t]itle to CBM is vested in the 
owner of the coal.”23 The 1985 lease was silent as to CBM or royalties 
resulting from the sale of CBM.24 Lessor argued that the lease violated the 
Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act (“GMRA”), 58 P.S. § 33.3, as lessee 
was not paying lessor one-eighth of all gas produced. 
Operator argued that it was the owner of the coal and as such did not 
have to pay a royalty on the CBM. The court noted the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania recognized the established rule in Pennsylvania “that the lease 
of coal in place with the right to mine and remove all of it for a stipulated 
royalty vests in the lessee a fee.”25 Therefore, “if the fee to the severed coal 
is vested in the lessee no interest in the coal as real property remains in the 
lessor and . . . his only interest therein is personal property.26 The lessor’s 
interest in the lease is properly termed a possibility of reverter.”27 Lessor 
argued that the “Pennsylvania Doctrine” of a lease as a sale was outdated, 
citing Olbum v. Old Home Manor, Inc.28 The superior court agreed that a 
coal deed does not always constitute a sale, but concluded that it did in this 
case: “[a]s the trial court explained, the leases in question clearly conveyed 
the ‘interest in and to all of the Pittsburgh seams or measures of coal and all 
constituent products of such coal in and underlying’ the various lands in 
Greene County.” Further, CBM “is doubtless a ‘constituent product’ of 
coal.”29 
Lessor’s other arguments regarding the minimum royalty act and the fact 
that lessees had not mined any coal or paid royalties aside from the 
advanced minimum royalty were dismissed because the owner of the coal 
was under no obligation to pay royalties on CBM nor under any obligation 
to mine the coal.30 Thus the court affirmed the trial court’s decision.31 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. (citing U.S. Steel v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983)). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 371-72 (quoting Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 32 A.2d 227 (1943)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 26. Id. at 372 (citation omitted). 
 27. Id. (quoting Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 32 A.2d 227, 233 (1943)). 
 28. 459 A.2d 757 (1983). 
 29. Birdie Assocs., 149 A.3d at 374 (citation omitted). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 375. 
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B. Cornwall Mountain Invs., L.P. v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr., 158 A.3d 
148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a 1932 tax deed of interest 
assessed as “minerals only” conveyed severed oil and gas rights. 
Cornwall Mountain Investments, L.P. (“Plaintiff”), filed a quiet title 
action against defendant owners (“Defendants”) of interests reserved in an 
1894 deed relating to “unseated” (meaning undeveloped for tax purposes) 
tracts in Lycoming County comprising 2,842 acres.32  That deed reserved 
“all the natural gas, coal, coal oil, petroleum, marble and all minerals of 
every kind and character in, upon, or under said land.”33 
The Lycoming County assessment office records indicated that the 
reserved mineral rights were not assessed until 1930 and 1931, when they 
were assessed in the name of “Thomas E. Proctor & Heirs.”34 In 1932, 
Cornwall Mountain Club, the surface owner, bought the mineral rights at a 
tax sale.35 The mineral rights were later conveyed to Plaintiff in 2010.36 The 
Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County ruled in favor of the Plaintiff, 
and Defendants appealed.37 
Defendants argued that the tax assessments of “minerals rights only” did 
not include the reserved oil and gas, and consequently the 1932 tax deed did 
not convey the oil and gas to plaintiff’s predecessor.38 Defendants cited 
Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 620 Pa. 1 (2013), which re-
affirmed the “Dunham Rule” (from Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36 
(1882)), which stands for the proposition that a reference to “minerals” in a 
reservation in a deed does not include oil and gas.39  
The superior court concluded that Butler affirmed the continued vitality 
of the rebuttable presumption of the Dunham Rule, but only with regard to 
reservations in conveyances between private individuals.40 The superior 
court instead held that a tax deed conveys all interests properly included 
within the assessment, which in this instance included the oil and gas.41 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Cornwall Mountain Invs., L.P. v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr., 158 A.3d 148, 151 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. at 151-52. 
 38. Id. at 155. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 156. 
 41. Id. (citing Bannard v. N.Y. State Nat. Gas Corp., 448 Pa. 239 (1972)). 
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The court rejected defendants’ second contention: that the oil and gas 
was not taxable because the oil and gas was not being produced at the time 
of the tax sale.42 The superior court relied upon the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania’s holding in Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 143 A.3d 
358 (Pa. 2016). Defendants also argued that the oil and gas was not taxable 
under Indep. Oil & Gas Ass’n of Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals 
of Fayette Cty., 572 Pa. 240 (2002), which ruled that oil and gas was not 
subject to property tax assessment. The superior court held that the holding 
of IOGA was prospective only, relying upon Oz Gas, Ltd. v. Warren Area 
Sch. Dist., 595 Pa. 128 (2007).43 
Finally, the superior court rejected claims that the tax sales were 
constitutionally deficient (again citing Herder Spring Hunting Club v. 
Keller)44 and that the tax sales were procedurally deficient, holding that the 
applicable statute of limitations barred non-jurisdictional attacks on the tax 
sales.45  
C. Murphy v. Karnek Family Partners LP & Range Res. Appalachia, LLC, 
160 A.3d 850 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). 
The superior court held that (1) a surface deed did not alter the initial 
vestment of oil and gas rights in grantor wife for life and remainder in her 
grantor husband and (2) a devise of “real estate property” included oil and 
gas.  
Joe Krynovske (“Joe”) and Bessie Krynovske (“Bessie”), husband and 
wife, (collectively, the “Krynovskes”) acquired the Subject Property in 
1931.46  In 1938, the Krynovskes conveyed the property to a third party, 
who then conveyed the Subject Property back to Joe, subject to the 
following language: “Excepting and reserving hereout and herefrom all the 
oil and gas in or underlying said parcel of ground. . . .”47  Through a 
separate deed, the third party conveyed all the oil and gas to Bessie “for and 
during the term of her natural life, with remainder in fee to Joe.”48  In 1939, 
the Krynovskes conveyed the Subject Property with the same oil and gas 
exception and reservation language contained in the earlier deed and added 
the following language: “This conveyance is also made under and subject to 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id. at 157 (citing Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 143 A.3d 358 (Pa. 2016)). 
 43. Id. at 158. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 160-61 (citing Trexler v. Africa, 33 Pa. Super. 395, 410 (1907)). 
 46. Murphy v. Karnek, 160 A.3d 850, 853 (Pa. Super Ct. 2017). 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
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a deed of A. Kirk Wrenshall to Bessie Krynovske dated September 1, 
1938 . . . by which conveyance all of the oil and gas rights were conveyed 
to the said Bessie Krynovske” (the “Surface Deed”).49  Joe died intestate in 
1959, survived by Bessie and their five children.50  Bessie died testate in 
1963, and devised unto her daughter, Helen Goodman, all her real estate.51  
The will listed certain property, but did not include the oil and gas within 
and underlying the Subject Property.52  Helen Goodman died testate in 
1987, devising “all the rest, residue and remainder” of her estate to her 
brother, Steve Karnek, Sr.53  Steve died intestate in 1988, survived by his 
widow, Lucy Karnek, and his son, Steven Karneck, Jr. (the “Karneks”).54  
Lucy and Steve then conveyed all of their interests in the property to 
Karneck Family Partners, LP and in 2014 the property was leased to Range 
Resources Appalachia, LLC.55   
The grandchildren of Joe and Bessie brought a quiet title action 
regarding the ownership of oil and gas rights in the Subject Property 
previously owned by their grandparents, arguing that (1) Bessie’s life estate 
and Joe’s remainder interest remained intact after the execution of the 
Surface Deed, (2) Bessie inherited 1/3 of Joe’s remainder interest at his 
death with the five children inheriting the remaining 2/3 interest, (3) the 
five children inherited Bessie’s interest equally at her death, and (4) when 
the five children died, their interests passed according to their wills or 
intestacy laws.56  The Karneks filed a counterclaim, also asking for quiet 
title, arguing that (1) the Surface Deed caused the oil and gas rights to be 
owned by Joe and Bessie as tenants by the entireties, (2) Bessie inherited 
100% at Joe’s death, (3) Bessie devised 100% to her daughter, Helen, (4) 
Helen devised 100% to her brother, Steve, and (5) Steve’s interest was 
inherited by his widow and son who conveyed their interest to Karnek 
Family Partners.57 Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment; 
the Washington County Court of Common Pleas dismissed the parties’ 
cross motions for summary judgment, determined the ownership interests, 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 853-54. 
 50. Id. at 854. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 854-55. 
 54. Id. at 855. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 855-56. 
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and ordered Range to pay rents and royalties accordingly.58  Both parties 
appealed.59     
On appeal, the court examined the Surface Deed language and the 
interpretation of Bessie’s will. When interpreting deeds, “the court’s 
primary objective must be to ascertain and effectuate what the parties 
intended.”60  The Surface Deed’s exception and reservation clause was 
identical to the exception and reservation language in the 1938 deed to 
Joe.61 While the terms “excepted” and “reserved” are often used 
interchangeably, the intent of the parties actually governs whether the 
language creates an exception or a reservation. A reservation is the creation 
of a right or interest that did not previously exist; therefore, in this case 
Bessie’s life estate existed before the Surface Deed, so no new interest in 
the oil and gas was created.62  The plain language of the Surface Deed 
stated that the deed was “under and subject” to Bessie’s life estate.63  The 
court concluded that until Joe’s death, Bessie had a life estate and Joe had a 
remainder interest in and to the oil and gas.64  
The grandchildren argued that under Bessie’s will, the Subject Property 
was not devised to Helen, but passed by intestacy to her five children 
equally, since Bessie’s will did not specifically mention the oil and gas 
underlying the Subject Property.65  When looking at the intent of testators, 
“a court must focus first and foremost on the precise wording of the will, 
and if ambiguity exists, on the circumstances under which the will was 
executed.”66  The court noted that “one who writes a will is presumed to 
intend to dispose of all his estate and not to die intestate as to any portion 
thereof.”67  Bessie’s will stated, “I give, devise and bequeath all my real 
estate property to my daughter, Helen.”68  The court concluded that the 
devise of all the real estate included the oil and gas within and underlying 
the Subject Property, and the individual property descriptions following the 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. at 856. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Mackall v. Fleegle, 801 A.2d 577, 581 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).  
 61. Murphy, 160 A.3d at 853. 
 62. Id. at 859.  
 63. See id. at 853-54. 
 64. Id. at 860. 
 65. Id. at 860-61. 
 66. In re Estate of Weaver, 392 Pa.Super. 312, 572 A.2d 1249, 1256, appeal denied 525 
Pa. 659, 582 A.2d 325 (1990). 
 67. In re Grier’s Estate, 403 Pa. 517, 170 A.2d 545, 548 (1961). 
 68. Murphy, 160 A.3d at 854. 
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grant did not limit or reduce the general devise.69  This interpretation of the 
will language was also consistent with the presumption against partial 
intestacy.70  The superior court affirmed the trial court’s order.71 
D. Hildebrand v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1046 WDA 2016, 2017 WL 2482850 
(Pa. Super. Ct. June 8, 2017). 
The superior court held that the non-apportionment language in the lease 
was not nullified by later pooling and lesser interest clause modification. 
Lessors’ and their neighbors’ (“Long,” “Schmidt” and “Schinkovec”) 
properties were all originally owned by Hupp and were leased to Lessee in 
1928 (“Hupp Lease”).72  The Hupp Lease covered 96 acres, providing for a 
five-year primary term and further “as long as the land was operated by the 
lessee in search of, or in the production of, oil and gas.”73  The Hupp Lease 
was modified in 1951 to permit gas storage and again in 2009 to permit  
pooling.74  The 2009 modifications were executed through four separate 
instruments with all of the current owners of the Hupp Lease.75  Lessors’ 
modification incorrectly referenced the acreage as 75.66 acres, while the 
other three modifications recognized the full 96 acres subject to the Hupp 
Lease.76  All four of the 2009 lease modifications included a pooling and 
unitization clause, which stated the following:  
There shall be allocated to the portion of the leased premises 
included in any pooling such proportion of the actual production 
from all lands so pooled as to such portion of the leased 
premises, computed on an acreage basis, bears to the entire 
acreage of the lands so pooled. . . .77   
The Lessors’ modification also included the following language: “In the 
event lessors herein should own less than the entire undivided fee simple in 
the property subject to the original oil and gas lease, then any royalties or 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. at 862-63. 
 70. Id. at 863. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Hildebrand v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1046 WDA 2016, 2017 WL 2482850, at *2 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. June 8, 2017). 
 73. Id. at *3. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. 
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rentals accruing under this lease, if any, shall be reduced 
proportionally. . . .”78   
In 2011, Lessee unitized the Hupp Lease with other property for a unit 
totaling 346.71 acres.79  Out of the 96 acres of the Hupp Lease, 76.15 acres 
were included in the unit, with 75.15 acres owned by Lessors and 1 acre 
owned by Long; Schinkovec and Schmidt owned nothing.80  Even though 
no Schinkovec land was pooled, Lessee assigned Schinkovec a 1.34% Net 
Revenue Interest in the Unit.81  Lessor brought a declaratory judgment 
action against Lessee and Schinkovec, seeking an accounting and a 
declaration that Lessee wrongly paid royalties to Schinkovec.82  The Greene 
County Court of Common Pleas granted Lessee and Schinkovec’s motion 
for summary judgment.83  Lessors appealed, challenging the trial court’s 
interpretation of the Hupp Lease provisions and subsequent lease 
modifications between the parties.84  
Pennsylvania law generally follows the rule of apportionment, whereby 
each lessor “should receive such share of the royalty as his or her share of 
the land bears to the whole tract covered by the lease.  It does not matter on 
what acre or hundred acres the wells may be situated.”85  By contrast, the 
Hupp Lease provided that in the event of a subdivision of the lease, 
royalties were to be paid only to the owner of the wellsite tract (non-
apportionment).86  The Lessors’ 2009 modification included language 
directing that royalties would be reduced proportionately in the event the 
Lessees “should own less than the entire undivided fee simple estate in the 
property subject to the oil and gas lease.”87  The trial court interpreted this 
language to mean that since Lessors only owned a portion of the 96 acres, 
they agreed that “any royalties accruing under the lease . . . shall be reduced 
accordingly.”88  Lessors argued that this language did not alter the non-
apportionment language but was included to serve as a “lesser interest 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at *4. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. This percentage was based on the fact that Schinkovec owned 6.1% of the Hupp 
Lease lands, which comprised 21.96% of the total acreage included in the Unit. 
 82. Id. at *2. 
 83. Id. at *1. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Wettengel v. Gormley, 184 Pa. 354, 39 A. 57, 58 (1898). 
 86. Hildebrand, 2017 WL 2482850, at *4. 
 87. Id. at *5. 
 88. Id. at *2 (citing T.C.O., 5/20/14, at 4).  
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clause.”89  A lesser interest clause or proportionate reduction clause permits 
a lessee to reduce royalty payments if a lessor actually owns less acreage 
than represented in the executed lease.90  Based on the language contained 
in the Hupp Lease and the subsequent modifications, the superior court 
concluded that the non-apportionment language was not nullified by the 
lesser interest clause in the 2009 Lessors Modification or by any provisions 
contained in the neighbors’ modifications.91  The court reversed the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Lessee and Schinkovec.92 
V. Commonwealth Court Cases 
A. EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, 162 A.3d 554 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2017). 
The Commonwealth Court reversed Borough’s denial of a conditional 
use permit for a natural gas wellsite. 
The Borough of Jefferson Hills appealed an order of the Court of 
Common Pleas of Allegheny County reversing the Borough Council’s 
denial of a conditional use application submitted by EQT Production 
Company and ET Blue Grass Clearing, LLC (the “Applicants”).93  The 
Commonwealth Court affirmed the Court of Common Pleas, holding that 
the burden shifted to the objectors to establish with probative evidence that 
there was a high degree of probability that the conditional use would 
constitute a detriment to the public health, safety, and welfare exceeding 
that ordinarily to be expected from the proposed use.94  Additionally, the 
Commonwealth Court applied its recent decision in Gorsline v. Bd. of 
Supervisors of Fairfield Twp., 123 A.3d 1142 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) 
appeal granted, 139 A.3d 178 (Pa. 2016), and concluded that the evidence 
presented by the objectors “did not constitute the requisite substantial 
evidence to thwart the Applicants’ entitlement to a conditional use as a 
matter of right.”95 
The Applicants filed a conditional use application to the Borough of 
Jefferson Hills to construct, operate, and maintain a natural gas production 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. at *5. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at *6. 
 92. Id. 
 93. EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, 162 A.3d 554, 556 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2017). 
 94. Id. at 557. 
 95. Id. at 559-60. 
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facility in an area zoned to permit oil and gas drilling as a conditional use.96  
The Borough Planning Commission unanimously recommended approval 
of the application subject to the Applicants updating certain information 
prior to the public hearing on the application.97  However, the Borough 
Council of the Borough of Jefferson Hills (the “Council”) unanimously 
denied the application.98 
In its opinion accompanying the denial, the Council found that the 
application failed to comply with the general requirement that “[t]he use 
shall not endanger the public health, safety or welfare nor deteriorate the 
environment, as a result of being located on the property where it is 
proposed, but otherwise satisfied the objective requirements of the 
ordinance.”99 The Council cited and gave substantial weight to testimony 
offered by the objectors, but did not place the burden to prove that the 
impact of the proposed use is such that would violate the other general 
requirements for land use set forth in the Borough Zoning Ordinance.100  
Moreover, the Council weighed the proposed use against the Environmental 
Rights Amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution, finding that by 
“approving the proposed conditional use application it would neither be 
promoting the public health, safety and welfare, nor protecting the 
environment from deterioration, when there is an acknowledged risk that 
the activity the proposed conditional use allows undermines each of these 
values.”101   
Without taking additional evidence or considering the Environmental 
Rights Amendment, but relying on the Commonwealth Court’s decision in 
Gorsline, the Court of Common Pleas reversed the Council’s denial of the 
application.102  The Court of Common Pleas concluded that the Council 
erred in two regards: first, the Council erred in determining that the 
Applicants failed to meet their burden of proving entitlement to a 
conditional use; second, the Council should have shifted the burden of 
presenting substantial evidence of any adverse impact on the public health, 
safety and welfare on to the objectors.103    
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. at 557. 
 97. Id. at 558. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
 100. Id. at 558-59. 
 101. Id. at 559. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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Affirming the Court of Common Pleas, the Commonwealth Court first 
noted that under a conditional use application, “once an applicant 
establishes compliance with the specific requirements of the ordinance, the 
proposed use enjoys a presumption that it is consistent with municipal 
planning objective and with the public health, safety and welfare.”104  The 
objectors to the application must then prove “a high degree of probability 
that permitting the conditional use will cause a substantial threat to the 
community”—a threat greater than that which would normally flow from 
the proposed use.105  In sum, “once the Applicants satisfied the specific, 
objective criteria for the conditional use, the burden shifted to the 
objectors.”106  The Commonwealth Court considered the objectors’ 
testimony, which provided general examples of harms posed by 
unconventional oil and gas development, and concluded that it was 
insufficient to meet that burden of proof that this specific well site 
presented those harms.107 
In a closing note, the Commonwealth Court held that the Council’s use 
of the ERA to supplement the conditional permit process was improper: 
Council’s decision to augment the conditional use requirements 
with criteria based on the ERA is tantamount to an attempt to, 
sub silentio, abrogate the legislative determination that a 
conditional use for oil and gas drilling is consistent with 
municipal planning objectives and with the public health, safety 
and welfare, including protection of the environment. Therefore, 
once the Applicants met the specific requirements of the 
ordinance, their proposed use enjoyed a presumptive consistency 
with that legislative determination.108  
B. Kiskadden v. Pa. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 149 A.3d 380 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2016), appeal denied No. 480 WAL 2016 (May 2, 2017). 
The Commonwealth Court held that the Environmental Hearing Board 
(“EHB”) did not abuse its discretion in determining that a well operator did 
not cause environmental contamination. 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. at 561 (citing Sheetz, Inc. v. Phoenixville Borough Council, 804 A.2d 113, 115 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)).   
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.   
 107. Id. at 563. 
 108. Id. at 563-64.   
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss3/20
2017] Pennsylvania 799 
 
 
Appellant, Loren Kiskadden, appealed an order by the EHB dismissing 
his appeal of a 2011 Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) 
determination that natural gas drilling operations did not contaminate his 
water well.109  EHB found that he did not meet his burden of proving that 
natural gas drilling operations contaminated the well.110  The 
Commonwealth Court affirmed, finding that substantial evidence supported 
EHB’s findings of fact in its adjudication.111  Additionally, the court held 
that EHB did not capriciously disregard materially competent evidence 
demonstrating the existence of a hydrological connection between 
Kiskadden’s water well and the natural gas operations at the Yeager Site.112  
Finally, the court held that EHB did not err as a matter of law in relying on 
speculative evidence to support its finding of fact that a hydrogeological 
connection did not exist between the well and the Yeager Site.113  
C. Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 157 A.3d 1018 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2017). 
The Commonwealth Court held that unconventional wells qualified as 
stripper wells excluded from well impact fees. 
The Commonwealth Court reversed an order of the Public Utility 
Commission (“PUC”), which held energy and production company Snyder 
Brothers, Inc. liable for impact fees due under Act 13, 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 
2301–3504, for production from wells that Snyder Brothers argued were 
excluded from the statute as “stripper wells.”114  Under section 2302(d), a 
“stripper well” does not have to pay impact fees.115  Section 2301 defines 
“stripper well” as an “unconventional gas well incapable of producing more 
than 90,000 cubic feet [cf] of gas per day during any calendar 
month . . . .”116  On appeal, the court had to determine whether the General 
Assembly, in drafting Act 13, intended the word “any” to mean “one” or 
“every.”117   
                                                                                                                 
 109. See Kiskadden v. Pa. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 149 A.3d 380, 381 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2016), appeal denied No. 480 WAL 2016 (May 2, 2017). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 400. 
 112. Id. at 402. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Snyder Bros., Inc., v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 157 A.3d 1018 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2017). 
 115. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2302(f) (West 2012). 
 116. Id. § 2301 (emphasis added).   
 117. Snyder Bros., 157 A.3d at 1020. 
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PUC argued the term “any” in the definition of “stripper well” was 
ambiguous because the word “any” was subject to multiple reasonable 
meanings, as evidenced by the interpretations advanced by the parties.118  
Snyder Brothers argued that PUC erred in finding ambiguity in the word 
“any.”119  The Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc, sided with Snyder 
Brothers and concluded that the word “any” in the definition of “stripper 
well” is unambiguous and “it clearly and plainly means what it says—‘any 
month.’ ”120  The court gave limited deference to PUC’s findings because 
its interpretation of the word “any” was presented in the course of litigation 
and had not been previously articulated in an official rule or regulation.121  
By concluding that the word “any” in the term “stripper well” 
unambiguously means “any” or “one” and not, as PUC argued, “all” or 
“every,” the court found that the facts established that the wells at issue 
produced less than 90,000 cf of gas in at least one month and are “stripper 
wells.”122  Therefore, the court held that Snyder Brothers did not have to 
pay impact fees for those wells.   
D. Nat’l. Fuel Gas Midstream Corp. v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., No. 116 C.D. 
2016 & No. 195 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 2391719 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 2, 
2017). 
The Commonwealth Court held that a wellpad and compressor station 
held by separate but affiliated companies could not be aggregated for 
purposes of determining the necessary air pollution control permit. 
The Commonwealth Court vacated and remanded an order of the 
Environmental Hearing Board (“EHB”) that affirmed the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection’s (“DEP”) Single 
Source Determination aggregating a compressor station with a well pad 
under a single air pollution control permit.123  At issue was whether or not 
Trout Run LLC’s Bodine Compressor Station and Seneca Resources 
Corporation’s Well Pad E, which is exempt from air pollution control 
permitting requirements, were “under the control of the same person (or 
persons under common control)” which would allow DEP to aggregate both 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. at 1021.   
 119. Id. at 1022. 
 120. Id. at 1023-24. 
 121. Id. at 1028.   
 122. Id. at 1030.   
 123. Nat’l. Fuel Gas Midstream Corp. v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., No. 116 C.D. 2016 & No. 
195 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 2391719 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 2, 2017). 
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facilities under the same permit.124 Through differing analyses, both DEP 
and EHB found the two sources could be aggregated despite being operated 
by two separate companies and despite Well Pad E’s exemption from 
permitting.125  The court vacated the EHB decision and remanded to 
determine either direct involvement by a common parent company in the 
operations of both facilities or to pierce the corporate veil by showing that 
the two entities are the alter ego of one another or their parent.126 
DEP applied a three-part test to determine if more than one facility 
should be considered a single air pollution source.127  Under the test, two or 
more facilities may be aggregated if they (1) belong to the same industrial 
grouping (having the same first two digits of the Standard Industrial 
Classification code); (2) are on one or more contiguous or adjacent 
properties; and (3) are under the control of the same person (or persons 
under common control).128  Here, the only issue in dispute was that of 
“control” under the third prong.  
DEP found the corporate structure and common ownership of Seneca 
Resources and Trout Run satisfied the control element of the three-part 
test.129  Seneca Resources, which owns and operates Well Pad E, is an oil 
and gas exploration company and a wholly-owned subsidiary of National 
Fuel Gas Company.130  Trout Run is a wholly-owned subsidiary of National 
Fuel Gas Midstream Corporation, which in-turn is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of National Fuel Gas Corporation.131  DEP found the Bodine 
Compressor Station and Well Pad E to be under common control due to the 
corporate relationships among Seneca Resources, Trout Run, and their 
common owner, National Fuel Gas Corporation (though one step removed 
from Trout Run).132  EHB disagreed with the common 
ownership/corporate-structure analysis used by DEP but still found 
common control due to National Fuel Gas Corporation’s power to influence 
or control the behavior of its subsidiaries through, in part, the “power of the 
purse.”133  EHB concluded that “it is the possession of the power to 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Id. at *3. 
 125. See id. at *1. 
 126. See id. at *14. 
 127. Id. at *3. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at *4. 
 130. Id. at *1. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at *4. 
 133. Id. at *6. 
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influence or direct the behavior of the parties or the course of events, not 
the actual exercise of that power that satisfies the requirement [for] 
common control.”134  Judge Labuskes, Jr. concurred in EHB’s opinion but 
wrestled with the conundrum created by the decision: How can two 
facilities be aggregated as a single source when one of those facilities is 
actually exempt from permitting requirements?135  The court took note of 
this question in reaching its conclusions.136 
The court rejected both EHB’s and DEP’s definitions of control. First, 
the court noted that DEP’s finding of control due to common ownership 
abrogates the general rule that corporations are separate and distinct legal 
entities, even if a corporation’s stock is owned by a single person, as is the 
case with a wholly-owned subsidiary.137  The court also found EHB’s 
“power to influence” standard of control too lax, stating that “the term 
‘control’ is more than the power to merely influence; it involves the power 
to direct.”138  Additionally, the court considered that DEP’s aggregation of 
Trout Run’s Bodine Compressor Station with Seneca Resources Well Pad 
E, which is exempt from permitting, ties the emissions thresholds of Trout 
Run’s facilities to the emissions from a facility that is otherwise exempt 
from permitting.139  Aggregating both facilities could lead to liability and 
enforcement consequences imposed on Trout Run due to the acts and 
omissions of the exempt facility.140  The court concluded  
[u]nder the facts of this case, where one facility is exempt from 
permitting requirements, but its emissions are still being 
aggregated with another facility for purposes of that facility’s 
permit, DEP is required to either demonstrate [National Fuel Gas 
Corporation’s] direct involvement in the operations of Well Pad 
E and the Bodine Compressor Station or pierce the corporate veil 
by showing that the two entities are the alter ego of one another 
or their parent.141     
  
                                                                                                                 
 134. Id. at *7. 
 135. Id. at *8. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. at *12. 
 138. Id. at *10. 
 139. See id. at *12. 
 140. Id. at *12-13.  
 141. Id. at *13. 
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VI. Federal Cases 
A. Tiongco v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 214 F. Supp. 3d 279 (M.D. Pa. 2016). 
The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied 
defendant Lessee’s motion for summary judgment on Lessor’s nuisance 
claim, holding that there was issue of fact as to whether Lessee caused an 
intentional nuisance on Lessor’s property. 
Lessor entered into a lease with Southwestern Energy Production 
Company (“SEPCO”), whereby Lessor received a bonus payment and 
royalties in exchange for SEPCO producing oil and gas from a unit which 
included Lessor’s property.142 While the lease language was silent on the 
matter, Lessor was allegedly told that there would not be any drilling within 
miles of her property due to the location of a water source.143  
Subsequently, SEPCO engaged in drilling operations less than a quarter 
mile from lessor’s residence, which according to Lessor created “excessive 
noise, light and vibrations.”144  Lessor filed a complaint against SEPCO 
alleging private nuisance.145  SEPCO filed a motion for summary judgment 
on three grounds: (1) the governing Susquehanna County noise and light 
ordinances established the proper standards for evaluating alleged nuisance 
activities; (2) the records failed to establish that SEPCO caused noise, light, 
and vibration harms; and (3) Lessor’s testimony did not demonstrate that 
SEPCO acted intentionally.146   
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 822:  
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his 
conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another’s interest in the 
private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either  
a. intentional and unreasonable, or  
b. unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules 
controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, of for 
abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.147 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Tiongco v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 214 F. Supp. 3d 279, 282 (M.D. Pa. 2016). 
 143. Id. at 282-83. 
 144. Id. at 283. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 285-86. 
 147. Id. at 284 (citing Butts v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., No. 3:12 CV 1330, 2014 WL 
3953155, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2014)). 
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As to SEPCO’s first argument, the district court held that county 
ordinances were not dispositive of what constitutes a significant invasion.148  
Under Pennsylvania law, a “private nuisance [may] flow from the 
consequences of an otherwise lawful act.”149  SEPCO’s conduct could 
comply with the county ordinance and still be found to constitute a private 
nuisance under the community standards.150  The inquiry focuses on 
whether SEPCO’s conduct constituted a significant and unreasonable 
invasion of Lessor’s use and enjoyment of her property.151 Deciding 
whether or not SEPCO’s conduct was unreasonable was a question of fact 
for trial.   
The district court also concluded Lessor produced sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that SEPCO was the legal cause of the private nuisance.152  
According to testimony, Lessor did not suffer from excessive noise, light, 
and vibrations before signing the lease agreement with SEPCO, and the fact 
that she observed SEPCO trucks driving to and from the drilling location 
was evidence of a legal causal connection between the two.153  There was 
reasonable doubt as to whether SEPCO’s actions were a substantial factor 
in the alleged injury, and thus, the question is left for the trier of fact.154   
SEPCO’s third argument failed because Lessor produced sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that SEPCO did in fact act 
intentionally.155 Pennsylvania courts have not conducted an in-depth 
inquiry into what constitutes “intentional” conduct for private nuisances.156  
Some states have adopted the Restatement sections and have held that 
intentional means “defendant’s knowledge that its conduct was invading the 
use and enjoyment of one’s land;”157 other state courts have found the test 
to be whether “the creator of the condition intends the act that brings about 
the condition.”158  Regardless of which test is used, the Restatement makes 
it clear that one need not intend to harm another party in order to be liable 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Id. at 286-87. 
 149. Id. at 286 (quoting Liberty Place Retail Ass’n, L.P. v. Israelite Sch. of Universal 
Practical Knowledge, 102 A.3d 501, 508-09 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014)). 
 150. Id. at 287. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 288-89. 
 153. See id. at 289. 
 154. Id. at 288-89. 
 155. See id. at 289-92. 
 156. Id. at 291. 
 157. Id. (citing Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 394 (Colo. 2001)). 
 158. Id. (quoting Keeney v. Town of Old Saybrook, 237 Conn. 135, 676 A.2d 795, 810 
(1996)) (internal quotations omitted). 
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for an intentional private nuisance.159  In this case, SEPCO need only know, 
or be substantially certain, that its drilling activities will significantly 
interfere with Lessor’s use and enjoyment of her property.  The district 
court found there was sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to 
conclude that SEPCO knew or was substantially certain, that its activities 
were nevertheless invading Lessor’s use and enjoyment of her property.   
The district court denied SEPCO’s motion for summary judgment on the 
private nuisance claim.160 
B. Canfield v. Statoil USA Onshore Props. Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:16-0085, slip 
op., 2017 WL 1078184 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2017). 
Lessors brought a class action against Lessees alleging various breaches 
of the lease relating to payment of royalties.161 Lessees subsequently 
brought a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
lack of personal jurisdiction with respect to one defendant Lessee, and for 
failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.162   
The lease language permitted the deduction of post-production costs, but 
the addendum to the lease did not allow deduction of such costs.163  
Plaintiff alleged payments under the lease, which were made by both 
defendant Statoil USA Onshore Properties Inc. (“Statoil”) and Chesapeake, 
were dramatically different due to the way the two entities calculated 
royalties.164 Chesapeake paid a royalty to leaseholders based on a price paid 
by third-parties downstream of the wellhead.165 Chesapeake’s royalty price 
was based on the final natural gas product after the deduction of post-
production costs and was calculated using the sale price of that finished 
product.166 Statoil, on the other hand, sold at the wellhead, fixing the price 
of the natural gas to a uniform hub price or index price for natural gas, 
regardless of whether the natural gas was ever delivered to that particular 
hub on the interstate pipeline system.167   
                                                                                                                 
 159. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 825). 
 160. Id. at 292. 
 161. Canfield v. Statoil USA Onshore Props. Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:16-0085, slip op., 2017 
WL 1078184, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2017). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. at *3. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at *4. 
 167. Id. at *3. 
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The district court found that Statoil’s payments based on index price did 
not violate the lease.168 The lease provided for royalty to be paid based on 
the proceeds from the sale of the gas, rather than the market value of the 
gas.169 The price paid by Statoil at the wellhead was the price it received for 
the gas. Therefore, the royalties were calculated properly.170 Furthermore, 
the district court rejected Plaintiff’s claim that Statoil’s sales to an affiliate 
at the wellhead breached the lease, finding that no provision of the lease 
forbade such sales.171 
The district court refused to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for breach of an 
implied duty to market the gas.172 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
declined to adopt the “First Marketable Product Doctrine,” requiring Lessee 
to bear all costs until the point of sale.173 However, the district court held 
that allegations of a “sham sale” between Lessee and affiliated purchaser 
were sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.174 The district court held 
that Lessor was also entitled to an accounting against Statoil, relating to the 
implied breach.175 Lessor’s remaining claims against Statoil’s midstream 
affiliate were dismissed.176 Subsequently, the district court rejected 
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.177  
C. Valley Rod & Gun Club v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 3:13-CV-
0725, 2017 WL 1173930 (M.D. Pa March 29, 2017). 
The district court held that Defendants were legally entitled to access and 
use as much of Plaintiffs’ surface property as was “reasonably necessary” 
or “necessary and convenient” to extract oil and gas to effectuate the lease, 
which included drilling wellpads and constructing roads. 
Plaintiff, a not-for-profit corporation, executed a lease with Anadarko 
E&P Company, LP, who then assigned part of the lease to Chesapeake 
Appalachia, LLC, who then assigned part of its interest to Statoil Onshore 
Properties, Inc. (collectively, the “Defendants”).178 Defendants notified 
                                                                                                                 
 168. See id. at *17. 
 169. See id. at *2. 
 170. Id. at *18. 
 171. See id. at *17. 
 172. See id. at *21. 
 173. Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 605 Pa. 413, 430, 990 A.2d 1147, 1158 (2010). 
 174. Canfield, 2017 WL 1078184, at *24. 
 175. Id. at *19. 
 176. Id. at *25-27. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Valley Rod & Gun Club v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 2017 WL 1173930, at *1 
(M.D. Pa. March 29, 2017). 
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Plaintiff that they would be drilling a gas well on its property and installing 
roads, access, and drainage, along with the well pad.179  During 
construction, Defendants used rock, soil, mulch and other surface materials 
found on Plaintiff’s property.180  Plaintiff brought an action in state court 
asserting trespass and misappropriation/conversion.181 The action was 
removed to the Middle District Court of Pennsylvania, and the district court 
dismissed the trespass claim.182  After failed mediation between the parties, 
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the claim of 
misappropriation/conversion.183  
The lease provided:  
Lessor hereby grants, demises, leases and lets exclusively to 
Lessee the oil and gas, including coalbed methane gas, 
underlying the land herein leased, together with such exclusive 
rights as may be necessary or convenient for Lessee, at its 
election to explore for, develop, produce, measure and market 
production from the premises. . . .184  
Under the terms of the lease, Defendants were legally entitled to access and 
use as much of Plaintiff’s surface property as was “reasonably necessary” 
and “necessary and convenient” to extract the gas.185 The district court 
restated the general rule of law that  
when anything is granted, all the means of attaining it and all the 
fruits and effects of it are also granted; when uncontrolled by 
express words of restriction, all the powers pass which the law 
considers to be incident to the grant for the full and necessary 
enjoyment of it.186   
The implied right to enter and use the surface property as was “reasonably 
necessary” to construct the wellpad precluded a claim that the materials 
were misappropriated or converted.   
The court also considered the terms of the oil and gas lease, as controlled 
by the principles of contract law: “The accepted and plain meaning of the 
                                                                                                                 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at *2. 
 182. See id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at *1 (emphasis added). 
 185. Id. at *4. 
 186. Id. at *3 (citing Obehy v. H. C. Frick Coke Co., 262 Pa. 83, 104 A. 864 (1918)).  
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language used, rather than the silent intentions of the contracting parties, 
determines the construction to be given the agreement.”187 In this case, the 
terms were clear and unambiguous; therefore, “the intent of the parties is to 
be ascertained from the document itself.”188 The lease contains the words 
“necessary and convenient,” which are unambiguous, and there is no 
dispute that in order to drill for oil and gas, Defendants needed to construct 
a wellpad.189   
Finally, the court noted an absence of a genuine issue of material fact.190 
Plaintiff never argued that the construction of the wellpad and road were 
not “convenient or necessary,” and the question of necessity and 
convenience was not a question for a jury; therefore, there was no genuine 
issue of material fact.191 
VII. Condemnations 
A. In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline L.P.: Challenges to Sunoco’s 
Use of Eminent Domain  
Sunoco Pipeline, L.P. has faced continued legal challenges in the 
Commonwealth Court to its use of eminent domain for construction of the 
Mariner East 2 natural gas liquids pipeline.  Building on its 2016 decision 
in In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., (Sunoco I),192 the 
Commonwealth Court issued four decisions analyzing varying challenges to 
Sunoco’s condemnation actions pursuant to the Mariner East 2 natural gas 
liquids pipeline project.193  
                                                                                                                 
 187. Id. at *5 (quoting Willison v. Consolidation Coal Co., 536 Pa. 49, 54, 637 A.2d 979, 
982 (1994)). 
 188. Id. (citing Hutchinson v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 513 Pa. 192, 519 A.2d 385, 390 
(1986)).  
 189. Valley Rod & Gun Club, 2017 WL 1173930, at *5. 
 190. Id. at *6-8. 
 191. Id. 
 192. 143 A.3d 1000 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), petition for allowance of appeal denied (Pa. 
Nos. 571, 572, 573 MAL 2016, filed Dec. 29, 2019). 
 193. See In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline L.P., No. 220 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 
2062219 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 15, 2017) [Gerhart]; In re Condemnation by Sunoco 
Pipeline, L.P., No. 565 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 2291693 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 24, 2017) 
[Homes for America]; and In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., No. 1306 C.D. 
2016, 2017 WL 2303666 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 26, 2017) [Blume]. In these cases, the 
Commonwealth Court upheld trial court orders overruling landowner objections to Sunoco’s 
right to use eminent domain to take private property for the Mariner East 2 Project.  
(Gerhart, Homes for American, and Blume all have petitions for allowance of appeal 
pending before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.) See also In re Condemnation by 
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In Homes for America, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the Court of 
Common Pleas of Lebanon County’s overruling of the Condemnee’s 
Preliminary Objections to Sunoco’s Declaration of Taking.194  Sunoco filed 
a Declaration of Taking to condemn property necessary to the Mariner East 
2 Project in Lebanon County.195  The Condemnees objected, stating that (i) 
Sunoco does not have authority to condemn; (ii) Sunoco’s corporation 
resolution does not authorize Sunoco to use eminent domain for the 
intrastate pipeline; (iii) Sunoco is collaterally estopped from asserting 
eminent domain power due to Loper v. Sunoco Pipeline, L.P.;196 (iv) the 
Declaration of Taking falsely represented Mariner East 2 as an intrastate 
pipeline; (v) Sunoco seeks approval for two pipelines despite that FERC 
only approved one; and (vi) Pennsylvania law prohibits Sunoco’s attempt to 
obtain eminent domain power under Pennsylvania Business Corporations 
Law without a FERC Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity.197  The record before the trial court in this matter is nearly 
identical to the one made Sunoco I.198   
The entire opinion is consistent with Sunoco I, stating that “because . . . 
these issues are directly controlled by this Court’s Sunoco I decision with 
which the trial court’s decision is in accord, we affirm the trial court’s order 
overruling [the Preliminary Objections].”199  The second objection, 
regarding the lack of authorization in the corporation resolution for the 
second pipeline, is a newly presented argument,200  the court disagreed and 
cited Sunoco I for the proposition that “[a] [Certificate of Public 
Convenience] issued by the PUC is prima facie evidence that the PUC has 
determined that there is a public need for the proposed service and that the 
holder is clothed with the eminent domain power.”201   
Similar to Homes for America, the Appellants/Condemnees in Blume 
sought review of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County’s 
decision overruling Preliminary Objections to Sunoco’s Declaration of 
                                                                                                                 
Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., No. 2030 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 2805860 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 29, 
2017) [Perkins]. 
 194. Homes for America, 2017 WL 2291693, at *1. 
 195. Id. 
 196. No. 2013-SU-004518-05 (Ct. C.P. York Co. Feb. 24, 2014). 
 197. Homes for America, 2017 WL 2291693, at *2. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at *9. 
 200. Id. at *6. 
 201. Id. (citations omitted). 
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Taking.202  Appellants set forth several issues on appeal that closely tracked 
the issues raised in Homes for America.203 The court found support in 
Sunoco I for the trial court’s order overruling the objections but expanded 
slightly on the “corporate resolution” argument raised in Homes for 
America.204  Here, the court noted that Sunoco Pipeline, L.P. introduced a 
corporate resolution of Sunoco Logistics Partners Operations GP LLC.205 
Sunoco Logistics Partners Operations GP LLC is the general partner of 
Sunoco Pipeline, L.P.206 The resolution, passed by Sunoco Logistics 
Operations GP LLC, authorized Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., to perform all 
necessary acts to effectuate the implementation of the ME2 project—
including acquiring all necessary rights of way.207 Appellants’ property was 
specifically identified as a property that would be condemned.208 Therefore, 
the court found that the trial court did not err in holding that the corporate 
resolution complied with statutory requirements and Sunoco’s 
condemnation was a valid exercise of the authority granted.209 
In the next challenge, Appellants/Condemnees added an argument to the 
“public interest” challenge, positing that the Property Rights Protection Act 
(“PRPA”)210 prevented condemnation because Sunoco is a private 
corporation seeking to condemn land for private enterprise.211 In Gerhart, 
the court disposed of the argument with two sentences: 
[I]n Sunoco I, based upon essentially the same record as was 
before common pleas in this matter, we held that Sunoco is a 
public utility regulated by PUC.  As PRPA expressly exempts a 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See generally Blume, 2017 WL 2303666. 
 203. Id. at *2 (“Condemnees assert a number of grounds to support reversal of the trial 
court. Although they enumerate nine issues on appeal, several are intertwined and can be 
consolidated into the following: (1) whether the proposed pipeline is solely interstate, 
subject only to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC); (2) 
assuming it is not, whether Condemnor has the power of eminent domain as a ‘public utility 
corporation’; (3) whether there is a public need for the project; and (4) whether Condemnor 
procedurally complied with all the legal requirements to condemn the property, i.e. passage 
of appropriate corporate resolutions and posting of adequate bond”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 204. Id. at *7.   
 205. Id. at *6. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at *7. 
 210. 26 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 201-204 (West 2016). 
 211. Gerhart, 2017 WL 2062219, at *9. 
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“public utility” as defined in Section 102 of the Code, 66 Pa. 
C.S. § 102, from the general prohibition against taking property 
for “private enterprise,” we conclude that PRPA does not bar 
Sunoco’s Declaration for Condemnees’ property and therefore 
affirm common pleas on this issue.212 
Gerhart also raised an argument that Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
decision in Robinson Twp v. Commonwealth (“Robinson IV”),213 which 
struck down 58 Pa. C.S. § 3241 (giving a right of eminent domain to 
corporations who transport, sell, or store natural gas), “reaffirm[ed] that 
Sunoco cannot condemn the Condemnees’ property absent a finding that 
the public is the ‘primary and paramount beneficiary.’ ”214 Sunoco argued, 
and the court agreed, that Robinson IV did not address the legality of 
eminent domain exercised by public utilities certified and regulated by the 
PUC.215 Instead, Robinson IV was limited to private, non-regulated 
corporations.216 
Building on Gerhart, the Commonwealth Court continued to uphold 
Sunoco’s power of eminent domain in another of the several landowner 
appeals objecting to that authority in Perkins.217 Before the court was an 
appeal of a trial court order overruling the landowner-condemnees’ 
(“Condemnees”) preliminary objections to Sunoco’s declaration of 
taking.218  In this matter, the Commonwealth Court undertook to fully 
address objections raised under the PRPA, which prohibits the use of 
eminent domain for private enterprise.219 The trial court held that Sunoco, a 
public utility possessing a Certificate of Public Convenience issued by the 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (“PUC”), is vested with the power 
of eminent domain and falls into an exception to the PRPA.220      
The Condemnees appealed the trial court’s decision only to the extent it 
overruled their objection stating Sunoco was prohibited by PRPA from 
condemning private property because Sunoco is using the power of 
condemnation for private enterprise.221 Section 204(a) of the PRPA 
                                                                                                                 
 212. Id. 
 213. 147 A.3d 536 (Pa. 2016). 
 214. Gehart, 2017 WL 2062219, at *9. 
 215. Id. at *10. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Perkins, 2017 WL 2805860, at *1. 
 218. Id.  
 219. Id. at *2. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
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expressly prohibits use “of the power of eminent domain to take property in 
order to use it for private enterprise.”222 That express prohibition is subject 
to a number of exceptions, including for property taken by, “[a] public 
utility or railroad as defined in 66 Pa. Con. Stat. § 102 (relating to 
definitions).”223 Finding that Sunoco fit the definition of “public utility” 
under section 102, the court held that PRPA does not bar Sunoco 
Declaration for taking the Condemnees’ property.224     
The Condemnees argued that the court’s analysis under the PRPA should 
include a determination that the project is for the public’s benefit.225 
Resting on Sunoco I, the court explained that PUC already determined that 
the Mariner East 2 project was in the public interest.226 Once PUC makes 
that determination, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to review the 
PUC’s adjudication.227 Therefore, the trial court “did not err in not 
engaging in a public use analysis.”228 
                                                                                                                 
 222. 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 204(a) (West 2016). 
 223. Id. § 204(b)(2)(i). 
 224. Perkins, 2017 WL 2805860, at *3. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at *3-4.  
 227. Id. at *4. 
 228. Id. at *5. 
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